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I. THE UNITED STATES’ INTERNATIONAL PATENT EXHAUSTION REGIME WILL
NOT ALLOW FOR PARALLEL IMPORTS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND WILL NOT
PREVENT UNFAIR PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The patent exhaustion doctrine generally provides that when a patent holder
sells or authorizes the sale of a patented product, the patent rights in that item are
exhausted. The patent holder cannot chase the item down the stream of commerce
to impose restrictions on its use or resale.1 One issue that arises is whether a
domestic sale is required to trigger patent exhaustion, or if sales overseas can also
trigger patent exhaustion. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) is agnostic on this question, providing that “nothing in
this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual

* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, California. Thanks to Mike Mireles and the
participants at the conference, Changing Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Pricing, Intellectual Property, Trade and
Ethics, held at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law on April 6, 2019. Thanks also to Ted
Sichelman and the participants at the Ninth Annual Patent Law Conference, held at the University of San Diego
School of Law on March 23, 2019. Dedicated to Dr. Kavita Vijayaraghavan Ernst, who may disagree with some
of my ideas, but who helps more people in a single hour of work than I will ever help in my entire life.
1. See generally Samuel F. Ernst, Total Patent Exhaustion!, 59 IDEA 41, 43–44 (2018).

475

2020 / The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Corrupt Price Discrimination System
property rights.”2 As a result, some countries have adopted a “national exhaustion”
regime, where only a domestic sale triggers exhaustion, but other countries have
adopted an “international exhaustion” regime, where sales in foreign countries
trigger exhaustion.3 The European Union (“E.U.”) opted for a regime of “regional
exhaustion,” whereby the authorized sale of a patented product in any E.U. country
exhausts patent rights throughout the E.U., but patent rights in the item survive to
prevent resale outside of the E.U.4
In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided that U.S.
patent law provides for national exhaustion, holding exhaustion only occurs “when
a patented device has been lawfully sold in the United States.”5 But, in 2016, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider that issue in the case of Impression
Products v. Lexmark.6 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (“PhRMA”) filed an amicus brief in the case urging the Court to affirm
the Federal Circuit’s adoption of a national exhaustion regime. Among PhRMA’s
arguments was that national exhaustion was good policy because it allowed for
geographic price discrimination for patented pharmaceuticals:
The current rule that foreign sales do not exhaust U.S. patent rights
allows pharmaceutical manufacturers to independently price and
distribute medicines in a socially optimal way. Differences in
pricing can provide patients in lower-income countries access to
important drugs, while also providing the opportunity for
pharmaceutical companies to recoup their costs and continue
further research and development.7
PhRMA warned that adopting an international exhaustion regime would allow
for parallel imports of patented pharmaceuticals into the United States, which
would force pharmaceutical companies to suspend useful price discrimination for
lower-income countries or to withdraw from those markets:
Faced with the prospect of automatic foreign exhaustion—and the
inability to assert its patent rights against entities importing drugs
first sold in other countries for lower prices—a U.S. patent holder

2. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Art. VI. [hereinafter “Trips Agreement”].
3. See SHUBHA GHOSH & IRENE CALBOLI, EXHAUSTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 88–113
(2018).
4. Id. at 103.
5. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Impression
Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 198 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017).
6. Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 546 (Dec. 2, 2016) (order granting certiorari).
7. Brief for Pharmaceutical Res. & Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Impression Prods. Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189), 2017 WL
894890.

476

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
might decide not to sell in a foreign market at all. As one academic
has noted, citing an example of a drug product in France,
patentholders ‘may rationally choose to abandon small markets
that contribute minimally to global revenues rather than accept
prices that would pull down the revenues that can be achieved in
other, larger markets.’ A rule of automatic foreign exhaustion that
would permit the importation and resale of U.S.-patented goods
from overseas, free and clear of U.S. patent rights, would only
compound pharmaceutical manufacturers’ concerns about
entering foreign markets with stringent price controls or weak
patent regimes that result in lower drug revenues.8
Despite these warnings, the Supreme Court rejected PhRMA’s position in
Impression Products, ruling that “a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts
all of its patent rights in that item, regardless of. . . the location of the sale.”9
And, PhRMA’s warnings proved false. Branded pharmaceutical companies
continue to engage in geographic price discrimination, although as discussed
below, they do not do so in a way that is “socially optimal.”10 Their ability to price
discriminate is facilitated by the fact that even under an international exhaustion
regime, parallel imports of pharmaceuticals without the authorization of the
manufacturer are prohibited in the U.S.
Pursuant to the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (“PDMA”), only the
original manufacturer of a prescription drug is permitted to import or re-import it
into the United States.11 Regarding re-importation, the statute provides, “no drug
subject to section 353(b) of this title or composed wholly or partly of insulin which
is manufactured in a State and exported may be imported into the United States
unless the drug is imported by the manufacturer of the drug.”12 PhRMA’s amicus
brief in Impression Products argued that this statute did not provide
pharmaceutical companies with adequate protection because “the text of the statute
makes clear that it applies only to drugs manufactured in the United States, not
those produced abroad.”13 However, the very next section of the statute prohibits
the importation of pharmaceuticals produced abroad into the U.S. unless the
original manufacturer has labeled the drug to be marketed in the United States
(something the manufacturer can easily avoid doing). The statute provides:

8. Id.
9. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1529.
10. Infra Section II.
11. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to
Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 643–48 (2005) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. 21 U.S.C.A. § 381(d)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 116–91).
13. Brief for PhRMA as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Impression Prods. Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l,
Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189), 2017 WL 894890.
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[N]o drug that is subject to section 353(b)(1) of this title may be
imported into the United States for commercial use if such drug is
manufactured outside the United States, unless the manufacturer
has authorized the drug to be marketed in the United States and
has caused the drug to be labeled to be marketed in the United
States.14
PhRMA argued it needed a private right of action to sue for patent
infringement to prevent importation despite these laws—suggesting the
government inadequately enforced them.15 To the contrary, federal enforcement of
these laws has been vigorous. As Kevin Outterson has observed:
Federal and state officials are currently attacking Internet
pharmaceutical arbitrage on multiple fronts. The FDA is
aggressively enforcing against U.S. companies involved in the
trade. The Customs Department has posted clarifications of the
personal use exception to discourage importation. Facilitators
such as the Discount Prescription Center in West Virginia have
been challenged by state Boards of Pharmacy as engaged in the
unlicensed practice of pharmacy. The FDA has sued regional
facilitators such as Rx Depot for assisting in the importation of
prescription drugs. The FDA and state pharmacy investigators
have also purchased prescription drugs in undercover
operations.16
PhRMA contended “[t]o PhRMA’s knowledge, the federal government has
never brought an action under § 381(d) against a parallel importer that legitimately
purchased a drug abroad and then sought to resell it in the United States.”17 This
statement appears false, or at the very least, disingenuous. For example, the
government sued and successfully enjoined Rx Depot from illegally importing
pharmaceuticals from Canada.18 Indeed, in the late 1980s the FDA promulgated
regulations automatically requiring detention and exportation of pharmaceuticals
re-imported into the United States from foreign countries unless the importers
14. 21 U.S.C.A. § 381(d)(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub.L. 116–91b).
15. Brief for PhRMA, Impression Prods. Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189).
16. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 193, 285 (2005) (citing, inter alia, Lolita C.
Baldor, FDA: Too Costly To Legalize Drug Imports, Law Vegas Sun (Dec. 24, 2003); Gardiner Harris & Monica
Davey, U.S. Steps Up Effort Against Drug Imports, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2004), at C1; Recent FDA/U.S. Customs
Import Blitz Exams Continue to Reveal Potentially Dangerous Illegally Imported Drug Shipments, FDA NEWS
(Jan. 27, 2004); Becker v. W. Va. Board of Pharm., No. 03-C-1237, slip op. at 11–12 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3,
2003); United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction
against Rx Depot)).
17. Brief for PhRMA, Impression Prods. Inc., 137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189).
18. United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 290 F. Supp.2d 1238, 1239–40, 1244, 1250–51 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
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could provide documentation establishing authorization from the original
manufacturer.19 The district court for the Eastern District of New York invalidated
the regulations for failure to comply with notice and commenting rulemaking
requirements.20 But, PhRMA’s suggestion that U.S. laws prohibiting parallel
imports are not enforced is incorrect.
There is no doubt that despite these prohibitions, pharmaceuticals are illegally
imported into the U.S. and that this can raise valid health and safety concerns.21
However, as discussed below, unlawful importation has not resulted in the inability
of the pharmaceutical industry to engage in price discrimination, even in the
context of an international patent exhaustion regime.
II. THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN BY THE BRANDED
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IS NOT SOCIALLY OPTIMAL BECAUSE IT IS NOT
BASED ON ABILITY TO PAY
In the abstract, geographic price discrimination has support in economic
theory.22 The ability to charge different prices in different countries according to
relative price elasticity in each region increases output while maximizing profit.23
In the pharmaceuticals context, price discrimination could increase the utilization
of medicines, particularly in the least-developed nations, thereby improving health
outcomes.24 The increased profits for pharmaceutical companies could encourage
more research and development and result in the development of more drugs.25
But, like most abstract economic theories, this one is based on the false
premise of rational, frictionless markets and people who are more akin to
dispassionate Vulcans than short-sighted, grasping, flawed human beings. Once
the premise is exposed as a fiction, the entire edifice crumbles.26 Sarah Rajec points
19. See Bellano Int’l Ltd. v. FDA, 678 F. Supp. 410, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
20. Id. at 416.
21. See Imported Drugs Raise Safety Concerns, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143561.htm (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
22. See Patricia M. Danzon, Differential Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Theory, Evidence and Emerging
Issues, PHARMACOECONOMICS 2 (July 30, 2018), available at https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Danzon-2018-PharmacoEconomics-1.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
23. Danzon, supra note 22 at 2 (“Under normal conditions, such price discrimination increases utilisation
by price-sensitive consumers and, in aggregate, increases consumer welfare and producer profits, relative to
charging all customers the same price.”); Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Price Discrimination and Social
Welfare, 5 CAPITALISM AND SOCIETY 1, Article 2 at 24 (“[P]rice discrimination can increase output and raise
social welfare.”); Christine Ongchin, Note, Price Discrimination in the Textbook Market: An Analysis of the PostQuality King Proposals to Prevent and Disincentivize Reimportation and Arbitrage, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 223, 234 (2007) (“Third-degree price discrimination is economically favorable because it allows
textbook publishers to sell textbooks in foreign markets. . .. Because of the increase in total output, average costs
are lowered, allowing for a reduction of prices in the United States.”).
24. Lichtenberg, supra note 23, at 25–26.
25. Id. at 23.
26. See e.g., Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be Able to
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out that geographic price discrimination “may not be the most desirable form of
price discrimination for consumers, however, because it is imprecise in identifying
differing demand curves.”27 For example, geographic price discrimination might
not be sensitive to wealth disparities within countries, resulting in less drug access
and utilization by lower income individuals. Indeed, this is the pharmaceutical
industry’s current situation: targeting the highest income individuals in the leastdeveloped countries for their branded pharmaceuticals. Peter Yu writes:
[B]ecause wealth is usually distributed very unevenly in many less
developed countries—South Africa being the most cited
example—some pharmaceutical companies choose to sell their
products at high prices that are affordable by the more affluent
minority, even if it means that the product will become
unaffordable to the larger and poorer majority.28
But even geographic price discrimination adherents agree it is a socially
optimal practice only to the extent that prices are set in relation to some measure
of willingness to pay.29 Prices should differ in various countries based on average
per capita GDP or income, for example.30 To the extent price discrimination is not
tied to price sensitivity in each country, it results in output losses and inequities
between nations with respect to the availability of medicines at all levels of society.
The problem with the pharmaceutical industry is that its price discrimination
practices do not adhere to these principles. Pharmaceutical companies engage in
geographic price discrimination and continue to do so even after the Impression
Products ruling, but the prices set are not tied to willingness to pay.
The most striking example of this is the high price of pharmaceuticals in the
United States as compared to countries with comparable average per capita GDP
and incomes. Studies measuring drug prices in different countries differ to some
degree in their results due to methodological differences and problems with
obtaining accurate drug prices.31 Studies vary with respect to the sample of drugs
researchers select for study and variables, such as whether to weigh the drugs in
the sample by the quantity dispensed.32 The accurate determination of drug prices
is hindered by companies varying from their list prices, offering discounts to
Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 445, 469–71 &
notes 173–78 (2014).
27. Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for Patents, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 321 (2014).
28. Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 844–45 (2007) (citing, inter
alia, Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 563, 566 (2002)).
29. Danzon, supra note 22 at 2–4.
30. Id. at 2–3.
31. See generally Judith Wagner & Elizabeth McCarthy, International Differences in Drug Prices, 25
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 475, 478 (2004).
32. Id. at 480–81.
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various distributors, and keeping these price variances as trade secrets.33 Moreover,
private insurers do not make public the effective prices paid by ultimate purchasers
of drugs, and Medicaid does not make public the rebates it obtains from
manufacturers.34
As a result of these difficulties and methodological differences, the studies
vary in their exact determinations of the relative price of pharmaceuticals in the
U.S. compared to other countries. Nonetheless, all the studies agree
pharmaceutical prices are far higher in the U.S. than in Europe or Canada. The
studies show drug prices in United States are approximately 32-41% higher than
in Canada.35 Drug prices are between 51%–60% higher in the U.S. than they are
in the United Kingdom.36 By comparable magnitudes, drugs prices in the U.S. are
also far higher than drug prices in Switzerland, Germany, France, Australia, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.37 By any measure, drug prices in the U.S. are
astronomically high and rising like a rocket ship.38 Robin Feldman reports that
between 2006 and 2014 drug prices in Medicare D rose by an average of 57%
cumulatively; that a 2016 industry report projected that drug prices would rise
11.6% in 2017 for young Americans and 9.9% for adults over 65 with wages only
rising by 2.5%; and that between 2000 and 2008, the prices of 416 branded drugs
increased by a range of 100%–499%.39
This price discrimination against the U.S. is not the type of price
discrimination that economists applaud as a social good because it is in no way
tied to the relative wealth or ability to pay of these various countries. In 2017, the
estimated gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita of the U.S. was $59,500.40
Norway and Switzerland had far higher per capita GDP than the U.S.: $71,800 and
$61,400, respectively.41 The other countries had per capita GDP comparable with
the U.S.: The Netherlands, $53,600; Sweden, $51,500; Germany, $50,400;
Australia, $50,300; Canada, $48,300; U.K., $44,100; and France, $43,800.42 The
story is the same with respect to gross national income (“GNI”) per capita. The

33. Id. at 478-80.
34. Id. at 480.
35. Id. at 483; Dana O. Sarnak et al., Paying for Prescription Drugs Around the World: Why is the U.S. an
Outlier?, ISSUE BRIEF, Oct. 2017, Ex. 2, available at https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2017/oct/paying-prescription-drugs-around-world-why-us-outlier (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); Danzon, supra note 22 at Fig. 2.
36. Wagner & McCarthy, supra note 31, at 483; Sarnak et al., supra note 35.
37. Sarnak et al., supra note 35.
38. See FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 7–8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019).
39. Id. at 7–8.
40. The World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP Per Capita, CENT. INTELL. AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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U.S. GNI per capita at the time of this writing was $60,200.43 Switzerland and
Norway were higher, with $69,920 and $66,390, respectively.44 The other nations
on the list are slightly lower but comparable to the U.S.: The Netherlands, $57,380;
Germany, $55,800; Sweden, $53,990; Australia, $49,930; Canada, $47,280;
France, $46,900; and the U.K., $45,660.45
Hence, the price discrimination that the pharmaceutical industry engages in
with respect to the United States is not socially useful under the theories of the
most committed price discrimination adherents because it is not based on
willingness to pay. The setting of prices in the U.S versus these other countries is
not due to price sensitivity or price elasticity. The true reason for unreasonably
high drugs prices in the U.S. is a corrupt system of kickbacks, middlemen, perverse
incentives, and anticompetitive collusion discussed immediately below.
III. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY’S CORRUPT PRICING SYSTEM
Robin Feldman’s groundbreaking new book, Drugs, Money, and Secret
Handshakes, provides an elegant and accessible analysis of why drug prices in the
U.S. are so high.46 Feldman describes “the highly secretive and highly concentrated
industry known as ‘pharmacy benefit managers’ (PBMs)” who collaborate with
the branded drug companies to raise prices and create economic pressure and
perverse incentives for other health care system actors to also facilitate price
increases.47 Only a brief summary of Feldman’s observations is possible here. I
urge readers to refer directly to Feldman’s book for the complete analysis, sources,
and details. That said, following is a brief summary, with any mistakes my own:
PBMs ostensibly work for their clients, insurance companies and other payers,
to negotiate lower drug prices with the pharmaceutical companies.48
Accordingly, insurers pay PBMs based on the discounts from list prices they
extract from the drug companies.49
Then, the PBMs write the formularies for insurance companies containing the
pharmaceuticals that will be covered by the insurance plans.50
In practice, however, the PBMs agree to secret deals with the drug companies
to artificially raise drug prices and then grant rebates. On the surface, it appears
the PBM has extracted a large rebate paid for by the insurance company. In fact,

43.
GNI Per Capita, PPP (Current International $), THE WORLD BANK (2019),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 7–8.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 13.
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however, because of this gimmick, the rebated price of the drug remains high.51
Moreover, the deals between the PBMs and the drug makers are kept as trade
secrets, even from the insurance companies. Hence, the insurance companies do
not know the actual level of a particular rebate. The PBMs can thereby often keep
part, or all, of the rebates they extract.52
In exchange, the PBMs agree they will list their particular branded drugs in the
formularies to exclude competition that would otherwise potentially lower prices.53
Moreover, drug companies induce PBMs with other kickback payments they
disguise with euphemisms such as “administrative fees or data managing fees.”54
Moreover, the PBM industry is concentrated, with only three PBMs— Express
Scripts, CVS Health, and OptumRX—having 85% of the market share.55 This
means the insurance companies have little choice but to deal through these large
corporate middlemen if they want to negotiate with the drug companies. The PBMs
discourage the insurance companies from demanding transparency or that more of
the rebate be passed through to the insurance company by charging more to
insurance companies that demand such concessions.56 Any insurance company
bravely insisting on a better deal with the PBMs and lower drug prices would
experience high short-term losses, resulting in insurance company shareholders
revolting and demanding new management.57
U.S. pharmacists are practically prevented from addressing this problem as
well. Although the FDA allows pharmacists to substitute a generic drug for a
branded drug in a prescription, pharmacists may only do so if it is the precise FDAapproved generic for the branded drug; but drug companies circumvent this
problem by patenting obvious variations of their products once the patents expire.58
Moreover, some PBMs, such as CVS Health, have acquired massive corporate
pharmacies, and can therefore instruct their pharmacist employees not to substitute
the generic.59 And then, the PBM writes a formulary that “give[s] preference to its
own retail pharmacy, restricting patients’ access to drugs and preventing
independent drugstores from competing for new customers.”60 The PBMs pay
kickbacks to large, independent pharmacies in exchange for dispensing the
branded drugs they prefer—motivated by the kickbacks they themselves receive
from the branded drug companies.61
The PBMs then offer kickbacks, artificial rebates, and other incentives to
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 19.
FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 13–14, 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 35.
Id.
FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 44–45, 61–62.
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 45.
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doctors and hospitals to induce them to prescribe particular branded drugs.62 These
are layered on top of pressure from sales representatives, who wine and dine
doctors, and marketing campaigns directed at doctors and patients.63
Next, drug companies provide coupons to patients to induce them to prefer
their drugs. The drug companies then fund “patient advocacy groups” to lobby for
policies that favor branded drug companies.64
Finally, all of this is compounded by the drug companies’ gaming the patent
system to extend their monopolies well beyond the 20-year term of a patent.
Through the practice of “evergreening,” when a patent is about to expire, the drug
company patents a new drug that is very often nothing more than a reformulation,
combination of known medicines, alternative delivery system, or other
modification that should be invalid for obviousness under the law but is granted a
patent anyway.65 If generic companies challenge such patents in court, the branded
drug companies often attempt a reverse settlement, paying the generic company
money to stay off the market and drop the challenge to the patent.66
Again, this is merely a high-level summary of the major examples comprising
the web of collusion and perverse incentives allowing drug prices in the U.S. to
soar unchecked.
IV. A SINGLE SOLUTION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY’S CORRUPT PRICE
DISCRIMINATION SYSTEM?
What can be done to lower the prices of pharmaceuticals in the U.S. relative
to Europe and Canada? Unfortunately, many of the proposals that are currently
being floated would do little to make a dent in the labyrinth of corruption described
above.
For example, one solution Democrats in Congress proposed would be allowing
the federal government to negotiate directly with drug companies for lower prices
of drugs in Medicare, the government healthcare plan for senior citizens.67 This
would be a desirable reform to reverse a bizarre policy whereby the government is
statutorily prohibited from interfering with price negotiations between drug
manufacturers and the private healthcare plans that administer the Medicare
prescription drug benefit.68 Also, the reform would ideally also eliminate the law
providing that the government “may not require a particular formulary or institute
a price structure for the reimbursement of covered [Medicare] part D drugs.”69

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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Id. at 50–51.
Id.
Id. at 55.
FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 60–85.
Id.
See Katie Thomas, Assessing Plans to Trim Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2019, at B1.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-111(i) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91).
Id.
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However, only about 43 million people receive drug coverage through Medicare,70
and presumably the drug companies would jack up prices for the remaining 284
million Americans to make up for any lost profits resulting from this plan.
Moreover, the current plans in Congress would only allow negotiations for 250
drugs.71 Other initiatives that only target Medicare recipients, such as lowering or
capping out-of-pocket expenses for beneficiaries,72 while desirable, also fail to
provide a comprehensive solution, and drug companies could offset these benefits
by raising prices for other payers.
Another option would be to outlaw the reverse payment settlements branded
drug companies pay to generic companies to settle lawsuits and delay the entry of
generic drugs onto the market. Additionally, Congress could strengthen the
validity requirements for follow-on drug patents to more easily deny such patents
for obviousness because they introduce no true innovation other than extending the
drug maker’s monopoly. While this, too, would be desirable to address the
“evergreening” issue, it would only address one aspect of the myriad of corrupt
practices discussed above.73 Specifically, branded drug companies would still have
twenty years of patent monopoly for the original drug and would still have recourse
to the non-patent related devices for raising prices; they would just be constrained
in extending their patent monopolies beyond those twenty years.
Another option would be to reform PBM practices or make them unlawful
altogether, something Feldman refers to as “slaying the dragon.”74 Certainly, this
would be highly desirable. But Feldman is skeptical of this as a silver bullet
solution because if the insurance companies were to negotiate directly with the
drug makers rather than through a corporate middleman, the drug companies could
simply use many of the same tactics directly with the insurance companies to block
low-priced competition that they currently use with PBMs.75 Consider the
following:
A company with a drug coming off patent would still have the
volume position that would allow it to offer attractive inducements
to insurance plans—inducements that the new, lower-priced
entrant could not beat. Companies with a stable of drugs—some
with stronger protection, some with weaker protection—could
70. Juliette Cubanski, Anthony Damico, &and Tricia Neuman, Medicare Part D in 2018: The Latest on
Enrollment, Premiums, and Cost Sharing, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 17, 2018),
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-part-d-in-2018-the-latest-on-enrollment-premiums-and-costsharing/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
71. Thomas, supra note 67; see also FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 60–85 (demonstrating skepticism of this
as an overall solution on the basis that “Medicare is an enormously complex program, which breeds numerous
opportunities for manipulation” and “the pharmaceutical industry has proven quite adept at outflanking the federal
government in the face of complex legislative and regulatory scheme).
72. Thomas, supra note 67.
73. See supra Section III.
74. FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 93–95.
75. Id. at 93.
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bargain across all of those drugs, once again sharing some of the
monopoly rents from one drug to strangle nascent
competition. . . . The fact that health insurance executives need to
meet financial expectations could enhance a drug company’s
ability to offer enticements. The short-term allure of persuasion
payments could tempt insurers far more than the uncertain longterm benefits of competition.76
Increasing transparency is another potential solution. The current presidential
administration enacted a regulation requiring drug companies to post the list prices
of drugs in their commercials.77 However, on July 8, 2019, after Merck, Eli Lilly,
and Amgen sued on the basis that the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) purportedly lacks statutory authority to enact the rule, a federal district
judge invalidated the rule.78 Given how little attention the public pays to the
voluminous small print appearing in the margins of pharmaceutical commercials,
such a modest and symbolic proposal would have done little to reduce the price of
drugs or even provide meaningful transparency. That the drug companies filed a
federal lawsuit to block such an inconsequential rule indicates how embarrassed
they are by their own price gouging.
One hopes that more ambitious transparency measures than this could be
effectively pursued. Feldman proposes various direct and indirect measures the
states or federal government could take to force PBMs and drug companies to
reveal the details of their secret agreements to raise drug prices and establish
anticompetitive formularies.79 Shedding light on the shameful details of these
contracts is undeniably a crucial reform. However, would it really solve the overall
problem? Elsewhere in her book, Feldman opines that providing insurance
companies the data files on all claims and rebate checks might be an empty gesture
because of the vast and complicated nature of the data:
[O]ne cannot overestimate the data analysis challenges and the
enormous time and resources necessary for health insurers to fully
interpret what is happening—even on their own side of the
equation. A full, claims, data transfer can be akin to giving people
the alphabet and assuring them that they can write Shakespeare.
Yes, in theory, in time, they could—but it’s not an appealing
approach.80

76. Id. at 94.
77. Regulation to Require Drug Pricing Transparency in Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 47 C.F.R. §
403.1202 (2019).
78. Merck & Co., Inc. v. US Dept of Health & Human Servs., 385 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
79. FELDMAN, supra note 38, at 95–102.
80. Id. at 33.
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If sophisticated insurance companies could not process this information, what
are the hapless U.S. Congress and the public to do with a dump of information on
the drug companies’ secret rebates and kickbacks to the PBMs? Even if the details
of this corruption would spur Congress into action, it would only raise a further
question: What action could be taken to control drug prices that would be
effective?
To answer that question requires probing into the roots of the problem. The
most likely explanation for the fact that the U.S. pays astronomically higher prices
for drugs than European countries and Canada is that these countries employ health
care systems whereby there is only a single payer for health care, the government;
or a two-tiered system, with the government paying for basic health care and
premium care available for those who pay for it.81 Because the government is at
least purchasing basic healthcare, these countries enjoy the power of a monopsony
to demand lower prices.82 In effect, the single payer can tell the drug companies,
“lower your price or don’t sell your drug in this country.” U.S. purchasers of health
care, however, have no such monopsony power, which allows for all the corrupt
monkey hijinks described above whereby drug companies can raise prices to no
perceivable limit. As a result, the U.S. bears a far heavier per capita load in
subsidizing the research and development of pharmaceuticals than any other
country.
Should the U.S. adopt a single payer or two-tiered health care system?
Although this may be the ideal solution, one must immediately acknowledge that
it is currently unlikely to happen in this country. Even in 2010, when the
Democratic Party held supermajorities in both houses of Congress as well as the
presidency, there was insufficient political will to adopt even a public insurance
option in the insurance exchanges established by the Affordable Care Act.83 Hence,
even in the best of political circumstances, we have not yet reached the point where
the U.S. would likely adopt a wholly government-funded health care system.
Accordingly, before considering that option, it is worth considering one final
alternative approach: an approach more in line with this country’s free market
philosophy. The answer to lowering pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. may lie in
allowing parallel imports from Canada and/or Europe.84 A recent report from the
81. See Kelly Montgomery, Differences Between Universal Coverage and Single-Payer, VERYWELL
HEALTH (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.verywellhealth.com/difference-between-universal-coverage-and-singlepayer-system-1738546 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing that countries with a
single payer system include Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, Finland, Slovenia, Italy, Portugal,
Cyprus, Spain, and Iceland and countries with a two-tiered system include Denmark and France).
82. See Wagner & McCarthy, supra note 31, at 486–88.
83. Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, HEALTH AFF. (June
2010), available at https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0363 (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
84. Brief for PhRMA, Impression Prods. Inc.,137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189). I would not propose
allowing for parallel imports from the least developed nations because PhRMA has threatened that it would react
to such importation by “choos[ing] to abandon small markets that contribute minimally to global revenues rather
than accept[ing] prices that would pull down the revenues that can be achieved in other, larger markets,” Brief
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Congressional Budget Office estimated that allowing for the importation of
prescription drugs from Canada would save between $1 billion and $1.5 billion per
year in government spending on pharmaceuticals.85 Theoretically, the
pharmaceutical companies would not be able to offset these losses by raising prices
in Canada or Europe because of the price control mechanisms and monopsony
conditions in those countries.
The E.U. provides one example of the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals.
The E.U. employs a system of regional patent exhaustion, that allows companies
and individuals to export products, including pharmaceuticals, from one country
to another within the E.U. without permission of the patent holder.86 Some studies
have found that this has led to a substantial decrease in prices of pharmaceuticals
in the importing countries.87 Pavel Kanavos and his colleagues analyzed four
studies on the effects of parallel importation on pharmaceutical prices in importing
countries in Europe. Two of the studies found substantial decreases in prices,
including decreased prices of 12%–19% in Sweden.88 Two other studies attributed
lower prices to other factors, such as the entry into the market of generic
competition.89 This would suggest it would be useful to combine parallel
importation with heightened validity requirements for follow-on pharmaceutical
patents and the outlawing of reverse settlement payments. Patricia M. Danzon has
observed that “[i]n the European Union (EU), traditional price differentials
between countries are being undermined by parallel trade and regulation based on
foreign prices. This break down of market segmentation leads manufacturers to
adopt uniform prices EU-wide.”90
Presumably, a similar effect would occur to at least some degree if the U.S.
allowed for parallel imports of pharmaceuticals from Canada and/or Europe. The
passage of legislation allowing for such importation would not be as politically
difficult as one might assume. In fact, the U.S. already passed such legislation in
2000, although it was never implemented and has since expired. Pursuant to the
Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, the HHS could have promulgated
for PhRMA, Impression Prods. Inc.,137 S. Ct 1523 (2017) (No. 15-1189); see Rajec, supra note 27, at 373 (“[A]
patent holder could respond to the introduction of international exhaustion by not selling drugs in low-income
markets at all . . . .”); see also Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The Case of
International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 17, 26–27 (2016) (observing that international
exhaustion could be detrimental to access to medicine in developing countries).
85. CBO: Drug Importation Saves $1 Billion Per Year, COMM. COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED.
BUDGET (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/cbo-drug-importation-saves-1-billion-year (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
86. GHOSH & CALBOLI, supra note 3, at 88–113.
87. See Panos Kanavos et al., Parallel Trading in Medicines: Europe’s Experience and Its Implications
for Commercial Drug Importation in the United States, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. 22–24 (June 2005), available at
https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2005_07_trade.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(analyzing four studies).
88. Id. at 24.
89. Id.
90. Patricia M. Danzon, Price Discrimination for Pharmaceuticals: Welfare Effects in the US and the EU,
4 INT’L J. ECON. OF BUS. 301, 301 (2011) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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regulations for the importation of pharmaceuticals from Canada if the Secretary
simply made the certification that doing so would “(A) pose no additional risk to
the public’s health and safety; and (B) result in a significant reduction in the cost
of covered products to the American consumer.”91 No Secretary ever opted to take
that measure, and in 2001, Tommy Thompson—the HHS Secretary under
President George W. Bush—made the contrary certification, stating to Congress
that “[a]fter a thorough review of the law, FDA has concluded that it would be
impossible to ensure that the MEDS Act would result in no loss of protection for
the drugs supplied to the American people.”92 Secretary Thompson continued,
“[T]he MEDS Act will pose a greater public health risk than we face today and a
loss of confidence by Americans in the safety of our drug supply.”93
Secretary Thompson’s statements are manifestly false. With respect to the
parallel importation of drugs within the European Union, Kanavos concludes:
[w]hile there have been problems that have emerged associated
with packaging, labeling, product inserts and potential violation
of trademark rules, there is no evidence as to whether these
problems have had an adverse impact on health care. Nor is there
any evidence that these problems have raised substantial concerns
among consumers, health care providers, or government
officials.94
And far from it being “impossible” to ensure that drugs imported from Canada
or Europe are safe for the American people, Kanavos writes:
[s]uch issues are not beyond the scope of legislation. For example,
safety provisions could include requirements that importers and
exporters be registered with the federal government and that the
government have the right to inspect facilities and places of
business, verify chains of custody of the products, and determine
compliance with regulations.95
A cynical observer might be tempted to believe that Secretary Thompson’s
conclusion was founded, not in a concern for the safety of pharmaceuticals in this
country, but by a concern for the profits of the powerful U.S. pharmaceutical
industry. In any event, the certification to allow for importation was never made
91. 21 U.S.C.A. § 384(l)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91).
92. Cahoy, supra note 11, at 646 (quoting Letter from HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson to Sen. James
Jeffords (July 9, 2001)).
93. See Daniel L. Pollock, Blame Canada (and the Rest of the World): The Twenty-Year War on Imported
Prescription Drugs, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 363, n. 214 (2006) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (quoting Letter from HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson to Sen. James Jeffords (July 9, 2001)).
94. Kanavos et al., supra note 87, at 28.
95. Id.
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and it appears that Secretary Thompson’s contrary certification has rendered the
legislation null and void, because it provides:
If, after the date that is 1 year after the effective date of the regulations under
subsection (b) and before the date that is 18 months after the effective date, the
Secretary submits to Congress a certification that, in the opinion of the Secretary,
based on substantial evidence obtained after the effective date, the benefits of
implementation of this section do not outweigh any detriment of implementation
of this section, this section shall cease to be effective as of the date that is 30 days
after the date on which the Secretary submits the certification.96
Subsequent bills allowing for the large-scale importation of pharmaceuticals
died in Congress.97
Due to the current public outrage at the crippling cost of pharmaceuticals,
importation provisions may now be politically feasible. Even the current
Republican administration has floated the idea of allowing for the importation of
drugs from Canada, although it appears to be a weak, token proposal.98 Rather than
authorizing and implementing a national system of drug importation for all
medicines, the proposal would merely allow the states to implement
“demonstration projects” that are “time limited and require reporting and renewal”
around the importation of some of the less expensive drugs.99 In particular, the plan
would exclude importation of almost all drugs that are not taken in pill form and
most high-priced drugs. This is because the proposal would exclude the
importation of “biological products [any drug manufactured in or extracted from a
biological source], infused drugs [drugs administered into the veins through
infusion], intravenously injected drugs [drugs administered into the veins through
injection], drugs inhaled during surgery, and certain parenteral drugs [drugs
administered into the body other than via the mouth or the alimentary canal].”100
Moreover, “the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] would have broad
discretion to terminate a demonstration project if the continuation could pose
additional risk to public health and safety.”101 In other words, another conclusory
letter like the one Secretary Thompson sent to Congress in 2001 stating that a
particular “demonstration project” posed a risk to health and safety would end that
program. Indeed, not twelve months before introducing the proposal, Alex M. Azar
II, the current HHS Secretary, called the notion of allowing for importation of

96. 21 U.S.C.A. § 384(l)(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116–91).
97. Daniel L. Pollock, Blame Canada (and the Rest of the World): The Twenty-Year War on Imported
Prescription Drugs, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 364–67, n.100 (2006) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
98. Katie Thomas, Rules Would Allow Import of Some Cheaper Prescription Drugs, but with Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2019, at A19.
99. Safe Importation Action Plan, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (July 31, 2019), available at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/safe-importation-action-plan.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 3.
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drugs a “gimmick.”102 To the contrary, his current proposal is a gimmick. As
Elizabeth Rowley, the director of the diabetes advocacy group T1International
concluded, “[t]his is kind of a distraction from the real issue, and the real problem
. . . which is pharmaceutical companies are setting costs at exorbitant rates and
patients are suffering and dying.”103
What about a true program for the importation of pharmaceuticals from
Canada and Europe, implemented nationally, applying to all FDA-approved drugs,
and enshrined in a statute that cannot be terminated by a letter from the HHS
Secretary? Would flooding the market with fair-priced competition lower the cost
of drugs in the U.S.? When I presented this paper at the McGeorge School of Law,
various experts in attendance expressed doubt. This is because the branded
pharmaceutical companies would react to such a reform by limiting the supply of
drugs to the countries of exportation, such that there would be insufficient drugs
to import into the United States. Countries in Europe and Canada would then
rationally bar the export of pharmaceuticals from their countries, in order to
safeguard a sufficient supply for their own citizens. Indeed, Canadian citizens and
the Canadian government reacted with hostility even in response to the current
U.S. administration’s toothless proposal for allowing limited “demonstration
projects” around the importation of the least-expensive pills from Canada. One
recent article reported the following response from a Canadian professor: “‘You
are coming as Americans to poach our drug supply, and I don’t have any polite
words for that,’ said Amir Attaran, a professor at the University of Ottowa, who
calls the plan ‘deplorable’ and ‘atrociously unethical.’ ‘Our drugs are not for you,
period.’”104 The president of a Canadian patient advocacy organization said, “[i]t’s
time for [the importation proposal] to crash and burn. . . . Canadians may die.”105
In response, Canada’s health minister “pledged to ‘ensure there are no adverse
effects to the supply or cost of prescription drugs in Canada.’”106 Options on the
table for Canada would include placing pharmaceuticals on Canada’s export
control list, passing a law banning the export of pharmaceuticals, or imposing high
exportation taxes on pharmaceuticals.107
Would the pharmaceutical companies really cut off their nose to spite their
face in this manner? Would they really drastically reduce their output of
pharmaceuticals to Canada and the entire E.U. if the U.S. approved importation

102. Thomas, supra note 98, at A19.
103. Id. (“[T]his is a plan to make a plan on importation. . . . This is not happening in the next week, in the
next month or likely even in the next year because the administration will need to carry out the rule-making
process.”).
104. Nicholas Florko & Lev Facher, Canadians Are Hopping Mad About Trump’s Drug Importation Plan.
Some of Them Are Trying to Stop It, STAT NEWS (Aug. 12, 2019), available at
https://www.statnews.com/2019/08/12/canadians-are-hopping-mad-about-trumps-drug-importation-plan-someof-them-are-trying-to-stop-it/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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from all of those countries? They were not able to do so in response to the
allowance of parallel imports within the E.U. because the E.U. has restrictions
“that manufacturers may not explicitly ban exports to other E.U. member states;
monitor the final destination of products; or make written agreements with
wholesalers or other direct purchasers to restrict supply.”108 But reducing output
of pharmaceuticals to all of Europe and to Canada to the extent that it triggers an
international pharmaceutical trade war would surely not be in the pharmaceutical
industry’s long-term interest. Indeed, allowing for fair trade of pharmaceuticals
may increase drug sales overall. While fair trade would reduce the individual price
of drugs, more drugs would be sold overall because sick Americans could actually
afford to fill their prescriptions.109
V. CONCLUSION

If the U.S. cannot rely on this free market importation solution of riding on the
coattails of low drug prices single payer and two-tiered countries negotiated, then
the only solution is to join those countries. The surest way to end the
pharmaceutical industry’s corrupt price discrimination system is for the U.S. to
adopt a single-payer system, at least with respect to pharmaceuticals. Although this
was not politically feasible when Congress passed the Affordable Care Act in
2010, times change. Members of “Generation Z,” now in their teens, are more
liberal and believe in government more than preceding generations.110 Should our
civilization survive the Climate Crisis, perhaps this new generation will implement
a single payer system. In this way, the U.S. government, under the threat of not
buying a particular drug at all and wielding the power of a monopsony, could
demand prices at the level of Europe and Canada for each drug. Such a system
would remove from the equation the profit-seeking PBMs and other factors that
create perverse incentives, kill competition, and exert economic pressure to send
the prices of medicines ever higher.

108. Kanavos et al., supra note 87, at 10.
109. Id. (analyzing four studies).
110. Colby Itkowitz, The Next Generation of Voters is More Liberal, More Liberal, More Inclusive and
Believes
in
Government,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
17,
2019,
9:32
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/17/next-generation-voters-are-more-liberal-more-inclusivebelieve-government/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).

492

